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Introduction
In numerous economies, the provision of public goods like education, research, and culture relies on private contributions as well as on government spending. Thus, in order to encourage private funding, donations benefit from a favorable tax treatment in many countries. In addition, public-private co-funding of public goods might counteract these efforts as government spending addresses the issue of crowding out private contributions. Against this background, assessing the overall efficiency of tax treatment is therefore of critical interest to public policy. On that account, the last decades have seen a lively interest in the analysis of charitable giving among tax policy makers and researchers.
The scale to which tax incentives are suitable to boost donation depends whether they are price elastic and to what extent. Hence, estimating price and income elasticities of giving are useful to evaluate the effectiveness of tax reliefs and if they are eligible to offset forgone tax revenues, which could have been used to provide public goods directly (Feldstein 1980) . Empirical evidence on this matter is not conclusive. Following Taussig's (1967) seminal study analysing US tax return data, numerous approaches were conducted. The review of 69 studies covering five decades Peloza and Steel (2005) led to ambiguous findings on price elasticity of giving due to heterogeneous data sources, the statistical methods applied and different periods under observation. In sum, their meta-analysis supports the hypothesis that tax deductions for charitable giving are treasury efficient. However, more recent studies have provided a different picture. Based on panel data, they find that previous studies might have overestimated price elasticity (Bakija and Heim forthcoming) or even that giving behaviour qualifies as price inelastic (Fack and Landais 2010).
The crowding out of private funding for a public good due to public spending is a welldeveloped field (e.g. Schmitz 1978, Nyborg and Rege 2003) . Theoretical framework provided by Samuelson (1954) with rational agents shows an under-provision of the public good. Moreover, the share of people contributing to the public good is decreasing in the number of agents, while government spending will completely crowd out private contributions. However, introducing the possibility to allow individuals to derive utility from the act of giving per se, leads to the impure altruism model of Andreoni (1990) and in this setting, government spending not necessarily results in a complete crowding out. In addition, incomplete crowding out also occurs in case of fiscal illusion or an endorsement effect (Eckel et al. 2005) . The setting of incomplete crowding out is supported by empirical findings.
Findings cover a wide range from 28 per cent (Abrams and Schmitz 1984) to 71 per cent (Andreoni 1993) , whereas experiments show that (depending on the chosen set up) complete crowding out is possible (Eckel et al. 2005) . Looking into the motives of giving, Crumpler and Grossman (2008) find that warm glow giving exists and that its magnitude is significant.
Overall, empirical research on giving behaviour has produced ambivalent results depending on the year and source of underlying data and econometric methods. The current study provides new empirical evidence on three key aspects of assessing whether this treatment of donations is efficient: estimates for income elasticities, price elasticities, and crowding out of private charitable contributions are provided for Germany. Deploying a rich sample of income tax return data for 1998 , 2001 and 2004 , we follow Fack and Landais (2010 in applying a non-parametric estimation technique of quantile regression to derive estimates at different points of the conditional distribution of charitable giving. In short, our approach is not restricted to answering whether current tax incentives are eligible to foster charitable giving but also aims at determining for whom tax incentives matter most. Therefore, the current study complements former research in two ways. First, the estimation technique helped us to establish estimates on income and price elasticities derived for the German case. Second, for the first time crowding out is introduced in this kind of econometric setting. The remainder of the article is organised as follows: in Section 2, the conceptual framework is discussed shortly. Section 3 describes the data and its preparation. Section 4 presents the main results for almost three million tax units. Section 5 concludes by reviewing key findings.
Conceptual framework

Impure altruism, crowding out and efficient design of tax incentives
The optimal theoretical design of tax incentives to encourage charitable giving depends on the modelling of philanthropy. As empirical evidence dissents the hypothesis of pure altruism regarding donations to charity, we start out assuming a world according to Andreoni's (1990) impure altruism model to define our efficient benchmark. In this world, individuals may not only derive utility from a public good but also from the individual's contribution to the public good . Three cases of altruistic behaviour can be distinguished: (1) Individuals are pure altruists and do not care for their individual contribution and does not enter utility. (2) Individuals are only driven by warm-glow. Consequently, is not part of individual utility.
(3) Individuals derive utility from and and are considered impure altruists.
To evaluate the effectiveness of tax incentives in a theoretical framework with crowding out and warm glow, we turn to Saez (2004) . In this framework the effectiveness of tax incentives can be easily evaluated. Assuming gross income to be derived from wealth and earnings , where the latter enters the utility function negatively to reflect that labor supply is costly.
In this framework, individuals maximise Under the assumptions (1)-(3), the optimal tax treatment of individual charitable giving is determined by the price elasticity of charitable giving:
In absence of crowding out, the rule for assessing the effectiveness of tax incentives simplifies and corresponds to Feldstein's (1975) approach of 'treasury efficiency', indicating that the tax-defined price elasticity greater than one (in absolute value) offsets each dollar of tax revenue forgone and adds more than one dollar to the total spending.
If is below one, tax incentives are not eligible to offsets forgone tax revenues. The rule derived in this framework allows the determination for each individual whether tax incentives should be increased or decreased. If tax policy makers were be able to query the individual tax price elasticities of giving, optimal tax incentives could be identified for each individual.
However, this assumption is not realistic. If private charitable contributions are crowded out by governmental expenditures ( 0), the rule for optimal tax incentives will relax. In presence of crowding out, tax incentives are treasury efficient if is lower than one in absolute value. Considering crowding out, it is important to determine the impact of public expenditures on individual giving behaviour. According to Abrams and Schmitz (1978) , government expenditure absorbs private action of individuals and relieves them from their social responsibility of contributing. Moreover, governmental transfers based on tax revenues lower the taxpayers' disposable incomes and thus their willingness to contribute. To capture the influence of governmental social transfers on charitable giving, we construct encompassing information on governmental spending for different cultural and social purposes. 
Econometric methodology
Modelling charitable giving requires taking different econometric problems into account (e.g.
heavy left-censoring and heterogeneity). They have important implications for determining the correct estimation strategy. Since a high fraction of tax units does not donate at all, tax return data contains corner solution responses for a nontrivial fraction of observations. In contrast to previous studies, we do not exclude censored observations from our samples.
According to Randolph (1995) , excluding censored data raises the issue of endogenous selection. Non-giving tax units can be easily included in our model by assigning a fictitious gift to all taxpayers who report no giving. Boskin and Feldstein (1977) According to Feldstein and Lindsey (1981) [ Table 1 about here]
According to Koenker and Hallock (2001) , sample regression quantiles are defined as the solution to:
3 An alternative approach focuses on log-log specification and assumes homogeneous giving behaviour (e.g. Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) . Their approach provides an easily computable and robust estimator. The first step is to estimate a probability model:
Feldstein and Taylor 1976
to select a subset of observations with X 0.
indicates not-censored observations.
We use a probit model to estimate the probability of giving. To identify our subset , we include all observations where * 0 X 1 , where is a trimming constant between 0 and and accounts for the size of excluded observations. Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) propose to choose such that X 1 seems to be reasonable.
We choose =10 th quantile of all X . The second step is to derive the initial (inefficient) estimator for by running quantile regression (7), which only asymptotically selects those observations with covariates such that X 0. The third step ensures efficiency of our estimates. Efficient estimates can be derived by running quantile regression (7) for a redefined sample . It is the largest subset possible with observations such that X 1 and X 0. Our final estimates are obtained as a solution to:
3 Data and data processing
All information generated in the process of taxation is documented in the tax unit's income tax return. It contains all relevant information on the family situation, the declaration of income from different sources, granted deductions and exemptions, calculation of taxable income and personal income tax payment. knowledge is limited to some tax units with high gross income. Therefore, these cases are excluded from our database. Our analysis considers only cases with a positive taxable income and complete information regarding socio-demographic variables.
The German Tax Code contains a blanket allowance for personal expenses. For every tax unit, we identify whether deductions are itemised or are below the blanket allowance. Tax units that do not itemise, are assigned a tax-defined price of giving of 1 €. For non-itemizers, there is no fiscal incentive to give. We must also account for another subpopulation of tax units.
The subpopulation of borderline itemizers is excluded from our sample. Borderline itemizers are tax units who exceed their blanket allowance just because of their charitable contributions.
Then, charitable contributions can be at least partially deducted from taxable income.
However, calculating , based on for the first Euro given, leads to = 1 for borderline itemizers. = 1 implies that there is no fiscal incentive to give at all. Thus, = 1 is no valid measure of tax incentives for borderline itemizers. In order to avoid distorted price elasticities, borderline itemizers are not included in our sample.
When interpreting 1 as a measure for tax-defined prices of giving, a brief discussion about endogeneity is needed. Endogeneity arises when marginal tax rates are used to analyse human behaviour. Tax units are able to influence their marginal tax rate through economic activity (Triest 1998) . Tax deductibility of charitable contributions affects taxable income and thus the marginal tax rate. Hence, is determined by tax units, at least to a certain extent.
The more an individual gives, the lower will be. However, if economic theory holds, high tax-defined prices of giving lead to small contributions. To avoid varying with the amount given, is applied for the first (marginal) unit of charitable contribution. Hence, is added to . [ Table 2 about here]
In order to calculate the tax-defined price of giving, it is necessary to account for some special treatments favouring certain tax units and kinds of income. The German Income Tax Code exempts several types of earnings, e.g. unemployment benefits or foreign income, from regular taxation. Although these earnings are not included in the tax base, they have an impact on average and marginal tax rates, which are applied to the tax base. On the basis of these earnings and the regular tax base, a fictitious tax rate will be calculated. This tax rate is then applied to the actual tax base of a tax unit.
Furthermore, German married couples benefit from a special taxation treatment, the splitting tax schedule. If taxable income is unevenly divided between the two spouses, married couples who opt for joint assessment can reduce their marginal tax rate. Hence, joint assessment favours married couples by reducing the income tax liability in comparison to single taxpayers or unmarried couples with an identical household income but different individual taxable income. In order to compute reliable tax prices of giving, all special treatments have to be accounted for.
[ Figure 1 about here] equal to 1 for taxable incomes below the basic tax-free allowance. Due to lower marginal tax rates, is higher for joint assessed tax units than for basic tax schedule cases. Progressive marginal tax rates lead to different net costs for two identical tax units, only varying in their 5 It is also possible to apply marginal tax rates for the last marginal unit. However, these marginal tax rates can be easier manipulated by tax units. Therefore, our estimates are based on marginal tax rates for the first unit of charitable contributions. 6 Detailed descriptive statistics are provided in the appendix A1.
taxable income. The net cost of charitable contribution will be lowered by high marginal tax rates. Taxpayers with higher incomes (and higher marginal tax rates) will benefit from higher tax savings and thus from smaller prices. [ Table 3 about here]
Results
All results presented in this section are based on the pooled sample, which is comprised of almost three million tax units. 8 Figure 2 graphically summarizes the main results of our empirical model: the quantile coefficient estimates for price, income and governmental expenditures. Lower and upper confidence intervals are indicated by a grey shaded area. Due to heavy left censoring, estimation starts with coefficients for the 0.46 th quantile. 9 All estimates for price and income are significant at the 1% level of confidence. The shape of the quantile functions supports the non-parametric regression approach and rejects the assumption of constant price and income elasticities for different amounts of giving. There is a positive but no monotonic relationship between income and giving. The income effect is positive for all quantiles. However, lower contributors are more income elastic than higher contributors.
This result is consistent with a more pronounced income effect for tax units with low adjusted gross income. 10 Hence, income elastic tax units are eager to donate even more relative to an increase in income. From the 0.95 th quantile on, income elasticity is smaller than 1, qualifying high giving tax units as income inelastic. We observe that tax units do not enhance their amount given to charity in proportion to their increased adjusted gross income, indicating a decreasing marginal utility of giving. Therefore, the assumption that charitable giving is a normal good holds true for the entire population of donors. However, our results also imply that tax units take their absolute amount given to charity into account rather than the amount relative to their income. It can be assumed that tax units have an individual upper threshold when deciding about their amount given. The gap between the actual amount given and upper threshold may differ for high and low contributors. For low contributors, the scope appears to be bigger until reaching their individual threshold. Therefore, tax units with small contributions are more elastic than tax units with high contributions.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Regarding the tax-defined price of giving, our findings are in line with the theoretical framework since the relationship is negative. Again, the quantile function is non-monotonic.
We are able to identify three different groups of contributors: (1) For this group, varying the tax price of giving will only slightly affect its decision as to how much money is given to charity.
For the highest contributors (0.99 th quantile), we have identified a price elastic behaviour. Our point estimate amounts to . = -1.140. Here, the decision to donate is highly sensitive to tax incentives and appears to be a strategy for tax planning (minimising personal income tax).
Using donations as an instrument to shift their tax base, these tax units will strongly react to variations of tax incentives. (Abrams and Schmitz 1978) .
To evaluate the overall effectiveness of tax incentives in the presence of crowding out, we have to combine the crowding out and price elasticity according to equation (4). For the overall efficiency of tax treatment, we can state that the combination of tax price elasticity and crowding out leads to an elastic behaviour for all considered quantiles and; therefore, tax incentives are efficient.
[ Figure 3 about here]
All in all, our main results lead in some aspects to different conclusions regarding previous studies. This is attributed to the estimation strategy applied. For instance, our findings challenge the overall effectiveness of tax incentives to boost giving if only price elasticity is considered. Our results imply that the majority of donators is not price elastic. Moreover, our results indicate that giving is heterogeneous among taxpayers and confirm findings for the French case. It is possible that part of the differences between our estimates and former findings result from different samples of the underlying income distribution. Our sample contains more tax units with middle and upper-middle income, whereas US studies are based on richer tax units, which react more to tax incentives.
The bulk of empirical studies on the crowding out effect find a negative connection between private charitable giving and public sector expenditure. 13 Our findings divide the giving population into pure and impure altruists or tax units which are aware of government funding.
Our estimation approach allows us to estimate the impact of government expenditure on giving behaviour across the underlying population. According to Andreoni's (1990) impure altruism approach, we find that small and lower medium donors are pure altruists (complete crowding out effect), whereas upper medium and higher contributors are impure altruists. The latter derive utility both from their individual contribution and from the overall level of giving. In addition to the impure altruism approach, our finding of a partial crowding out effect can either be result from fiscal illusion or an endorsement effect (Eckel et al. 2005 ).
[ Figure 4 about here]
To complete the picture, we provide estimates for the socio-demographic control variables in Figure 4 . Giving to charity strongly depends on age. Younger tax units give ceteris paribus less, older tax units give more. Children, church membership and marriage mainly have a 11 See e.g. Schwartz (1970 ), Feldstein (1975 ), Feldstein and Taylor (1976 ), Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976 , Boskin and Feldstein (1977) , Clotfelter (1980) , Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981) , Barrett (1991) , Randolph (1995) , as well as Reece (1979) and Auten et al. (2002) . 12 Paqué (1986) deploys time-series data for the period from 1961 to 1980. Analysing 55 observations, Paqué quantifies giving as price and income elastic. Deploying a sample of German income tax return data for 1998 and using Tobit regression model, von Auer and Kalusche (2007) find that giving behaviour in Germany is price elastic but not income elastic. 13 Clotfelter (1985) reports an average crowding out of only about 5%. Kingma (1989) finds crowding out of 13.5%. Khanna and Sandler (2000) prove evidence for crowding in between 13% and 89%. Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) find that crowding out is not significantly different from zero. Andreoni and Payne (2009) indicate two crowding out effects. Distinguishing between the classic crowding out of donors and the crowding out of fund raising by government grants, they find that crowding out is primarily due to reduced fund-raising and ranges from 70% to 100%, whereas classic crowding out amounts to only 30%.
positive effect on giving behaviour. Tax units whose income is predominantly based on employment income donate less than tax units that mainly derive other types of income. The year dummies or 1998 and 2001 are of comparable magnitude for all quantiles and negative, this may point to the income effect exceeding the price effect of changes in tax schedule (see Figure 1) . Furthermore, the functions are monotonically decreasing in the absolute value of donations and indicate an economically small but significant difference in giving behaviour over the period under consideration.
Conclusions
We have examined a rich body of income tax return data on philanthropic activity. Our estimations refer to a representative sample of German taxpayers. Contrary to the vast majority of empirical studies but similar to more current approaches, e.g. Fack and Landaise (2010), we assume non-constant price and income elasticities. Censored quantile regression is eligible to deal with heavy-censoring and allows for heterogeneity in giving behaviour. Our findings challenge the view that the tax deductibility of charitable contributions is overall treasury efficient unless crowding out is taken into account. If there are to be any fiscal incentives, they are appropriate to activate tax units who have not given yet. Furthermore, tax units with very generous donations are highly responsive to tax incentives due to low prices of giving. From a public-finance point of view, our results imply that there should be a differentiation between 'good' (price elastic) and 'bad' (price inelastic) tax units to allocate tax incentives more effectively. Although our findings qualify tax reliefs for charitable giving as ineffective for the majority of tax units, they do not necessarily imply that tax incentives are useless and should be abolished. In particular, if crowding is taken into account our results confirm the treasury efficiency of the current tax treatment. Furthermore, there may be several more reasons to justify the current system.
From a political perspective, existing tax incentives for charitable giving set a clear signal for codetermination. Taxpayers are required to reveal their preferences and decide on their own scarce resources for financing desired public goods. Furthermore, it is possible that the elimination of tax incentives will cause considerable public and political pressure. Lobbyists of charity groups will insist on maintaining tax reliefs for charitable giving and highlight their positive external effects on social well-being. Moreover, they may argue that removing tax incentives for charitable giving will be seen as a harsh blow against private philanthropy and codetermination.
Assuming that public goods can be provided at different public and private opportunity costs, it might be reasonable to foster private philanthropy through tax incentives. The greater the comparative advantage of private provision, the better the case for granting tax reliefs for charitable giving. Private charity organisations must be competitive and transparent to acquire new funds. Due to lean structures and competitive markets, private provision appears to be more effective than public provision. Hence, forgone tax revenues resulting from tax reliefs might be smaller than wasted tax revenues resulting from ineffective public provision.
Overall, our empirical results must be interpreted with caution. Although the data contains detailed information of German taxpayers and is a convenient source for tax policy research, the age of the data may hamper the analysis of today's charitable giving behaviour.
Furthermore, our analysis is constrained to cross-section data and a pooled sample. There is a wide variety of panel data methods to investigate tax policy over time. Recent US studies (e.g. Table 6 presents the adjustments made to derive the Adjusted Gross Income. Bach et al. (2009) give more detailed information about adjusted gross income. At some points, our calculations differ from their approach. Figure S1 . Quantile coefficient estimates for 1998
A2: Adjusted Gross Income
Note: Solid lines denote point estimates for the respective quantile; grey areas denote the 95 th confidence interval. 
